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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CURTIS J. BELLER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, i 
v. 1 
NANETTE ROLFE, Director, Utah State 
Driver License Division, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060641 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER STRIKING OR 
DISREGARDING ROLFE'S BRIEF FOR VIOLATING RULE 24, 
AND THE COURT SHOULD NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF 
MATTERS OUTSIDE THE RECORD WHICH ARE ASSERTED 
IN SUPPORT OF ARGUMENTS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and (e) require the parties to cite to the 
original record for factual assertions in briefs. Subsection (k) of the same rule permits the 
Court to disregard or strike briefs which do not comply with Rule 24. When briefs fail to 
cite to the record, and when briefs include matters which were not admitted in evidence 
below, this Court may strike them in their entirety. See, e.g.. Beehive Tel. Co. v. Pub. 
Serv.Comm'nofUtah. 2004 UT 18,112, 89 P.3d 131 (briefs may be disregarded or 
stricken for failure to comply with the mandate of rule (a)(9) to cite to the record in the 
arguments), Mauehn v. Mauehn. 770 P.2d 156,161 n.l (Utah App. 1989) (granting 
motion to strike reply brief which appended documents in support of argument, which 
documents were created after the appeal was complete). 
Roife's brief asserts the purported contents of Driver License Division's Annual 
Report for FY 2006 in arguing that the waiver doctrine should not apply to her in the 
division hearings, because this would impose an unduly onerous burden, given the 
number of hearings the Division conducts. Roife's brief at 18. This report was not 
placed in evidence or asserted below, in response to Beller's argument that the hearing 
officers routinely take evidence on constitutional issues and refrain from taking action 
against driver licenses in cases where the police violate the Fourth Amendment (R. 54-
55), or at any other time. Accordingly, the report should not be asserted in Roife's brief, 
which is subject to being stricken or disregarded as a result of the inclusion of the 
evidence, which is outside the record and cannot be supported with a record citation. 
See, e.g.. Rule 24(a)(e) and (k), Maughn, Beehive Tel. Co., supra. 
Roife's brief appends the CD of the hearing before the Division, which was never 
put in evidence in the lower court. This likewise renders the brief subject to being 
stricken or disregarded by the Court. See, e.g.. Rule 24(k), Maughn, supra. 
Rolfe notes that the Court can take judicial notice of the proceedings before the 
hearing officer. Roife's brief at 5 n.2 and Addendum C. While Moore v. Utah Technical 
College, 727 P.2d 634,638 n.17 (Utah 1986), does stand for the proposition that courts 
may take judicial notice of published agency hearings, Rolfe provides nothing to support 
the assumption that the hearing in the instant matter was published. Roife's assertion that 
2 
the Court may take judicial notice of the CD because it constitutes a public record, 
Rolfe's brief at 6 n.2, is likewise unsupported. 
It further appears that it may be inappropriate to take judicial notice of the CD, 
because it was not ever placed in evidence below. Cf., Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 
2006 WL 3690665 (indicating that positions of attorney general's office in other cases 
were evidence outside the record which the Court generally does not consider on appeal); 
State v. Shreve, 514 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1973) (refusing to take judicial notice of court 
records from other cases not admitted in evidence). But see Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 922 P.2d 745, 751-52 and n.l 1 (Utah 1996) (parties included tape recording of 
administrative hearing at the court's request, the but the court remanded the matter to the 
trial court for consideration, as the trial court had not made findings regarding the 
hearing). 
Appellate courts are not required to take judicial notice, and generally do not take 
judicial notice unless there is a "compelling countervailing principle" to the policy 
reasons behind the waiver doctrine to justify doing so. See, e.g., Finlavson v. Finlavson, 
874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch Inc.. 
758 P.2d 451,456 (Utah App.), cert denied. 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). Appellate courts 
generally will not take judicial notice if requested to do so by a party who has failed to 
raise in the lower court the argument for which judicial notice is sought. Finlavson, 874 
P.2dat847. 
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The Court should refrain from taking judicial notice of the proceedings below to 
reverse Judge Medley's ruling that the traffic stop violated Beller's constitutional rights, 
and should not take judicial notice of the CD in support of any argument that Rolfe 
waived in the lower court, such as her arguments that Beller waived his challenges to the 
legality of the traffic stop, or his pursuit of the application of the exclusionary rule, see 
Point II of this brief, infra. See Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch Inc., 758 
P.2d 451, 456 (Utah App.) (Court may exercise discretion to take judicial notice of 
records for the first time on appeal to affirm the lower court, but not to reverse it, and 
generally does not exercise discretion to take judicial notice to reverse the lower court), 
cert, denied, 769 P.2d 819 (Utah 1988). 
II. BELLER DID NOT WAIVE HIS ISSUES IN THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING; THE DIVISION WAIVED 
ITS WAIVER ARGUMENTS IN THE LOWER COURT. 
Rolfe argues that Beller waived the issue of the lack of reasonable suspicion for 
the stop by failing to raise it before the administrative hearing officer. Rolfe's brief at 13-
17. She also argues that Beller waived the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applies 
to driver's license proceedings. Id. at 19-21. 
Rolfe did not make its waiver arguments in the trial court (R. 41-48), and has 
alleged no plain error or exceptional circumstances to justify this Court's reaching the 
4 
issue for the first time on appeal.1 The trial court was never given and never took the 
opportunity to consider the waiver issue below. Accordingly, Rolfe's waiver argument 
should not be addressed by this Court. See, e ^ , Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, % 39, 
86 P.3d 699 (declining to reach issue raised for the first time on appeal, where party failed 
to justify consideration of the unpreserved issue). 
Fundamental administrative law requires a party to an administrative proceeding to 
"bring an issue to the fact finder's attention so that there is at least the possibility that it 
could be considered." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). 
This rule requires parties to bring factual issues to the attention of the fact finder, but does 
not require exact legal precision. Rather, the standard is a lesser "level of consciousness 
test," requiring parties to bring "factual" issues to the attention of the fact finder so "there 
is at least a possibility" that they will be addressed. Id. Accord Rolfe's brief at 14 and 
18. 
In the instant matter, counsel for Beller did bring the facts underlying Beller's 
arguments to the consciousness or attention of the hearing officer, by cross-examining the 
officers concerning the facts underlying the legality of the traffic stop, and then by 
arguing that Division should refrain from taking Belter's license because the traffic stop 
lRolfe argues that she argued in the trial court that Beller was "belatedly 
attempting to suppress evidence of Belter's drunk driving by invoking the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule. R. 41." Neither page 41 of the record nor any other page 
of the record appears to support the assertion that Rolfe argued that Belter's Fourth 
Amendment arguments to the trial court were late or waived. 
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was unlawful. See Addendum C to Rolfe's brief. Particularly given the standard practice 
of the agency to hear evidence regarding the constitutionality of traffic stops and to 
refrain from taking action in cases where the stops are unconstitutional (R. 54-55),2 and 
that the sole focus of Beller before the Division was to prevent them from taking his 
license on the basis of evidence gleaned through the unconstitutional traffic stop 
(Addendum C to Rolfe's brief), in the event this Court addresses Rolfe's unpreserved 
arguments on the merits, but see, e.g., Dewsnup, supra, the Court should reject Rolfe's 
claim of waiver, see Badger, supra. 
With regard to Rolfe's argument that the Court should not address the application 
of the state constitutional exclusionary rule because Beller did not preserve the argument 
in the court below, Rolfe's brief at 19-21, the fact that Judge Medley explicitly addressed 
state constitutional law on the issue (R. 67-69) establishes preservation of the issue for 
2Rolfe contends that there is no evidence in the record to support Beller's "self 
serving" argument that the hearing officers routinely consider the constitutionality of 
traffic stops at driver license hearings. Rolfe's brief at 22. While it was not presented to 
the lower court and is not in the record, the driver license hearing in the instant matter 
demonstrates that the hearing officer in this case considered such evidence and argument 
without any difficulty. See Addendum C to Rolfe's brief. Moreover, in the trial court, 
Rebecca Waldron, the same lawyer who routinely represents the Division in the appeals 
from the driver license hearings, e.g., Nolen v. Hamaker-Mann. 2006 UT App 97,2006 
WL 63296 (unpublished); Gonzales v. Blackstock. 2005 UT App 256, 2005 WL 1317061 
(unpublished), did not object when the lawfulness of the traffic stop was thoroughly 
addressed with the witnesses who testified at the de novo trial before the trial court (R. 
79: 3-16). In fact, Ms. Waldron acknowledged at the outset of the evidentiary hearing 
that the only factual issue to be addressed at the trial de novo would be the reason for the 
traffic stop (R. 79: 3). 
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appeal. See, e ^ Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT 41, fflj 15 and 24, 2007 WL 1452648. The 
purpose of the waiver doctrine is to insure that trial courts are given the first opportunity 
to address issues and correct errors, so that our courts proceed in an orderly manner. Id. 
at f 15. Regardless of whether the party who is appealing brought the matter to a trial 
court's attention, if the trial court noticed an issue and took the opportunity to address the 
issue, the issue is considered preserved for purposes of appeal. Id. at f^ 24 (holding that 
issue was preserved by trial court's ruling on specific issue, despite the fact that the issue 
was brought to the trial court's attention by a party other than the appellant). 
In the instant matter, Judge Medley expressly recognized that Sims v. Collection 
Div. of Utah State Tax Div., 841 P.2d 6 (Utah \992){plurality\ applies the state 
constitutional exclusionary rule to quasi-criminal proceedings, and then proceeded to 
analyze the law leading to his conclusion that the proceedings before the Division are not 
properly viewed as quasi-criminal. (R. 67-69). But see Rolfe's brief at 8 n.4 (arguing 
that Beller is in error in asserting that the trial court's ruling was based on the state 
constitutional issue; claiming that the trial court instead "mentioned the state constitution 
in his ruling). Because the state constitutional issue was squarely addressed by the trial 
court and is challenged by Beller on appeal,3 the issue is preserved for this Court's 
3Rolfe asserts that Beller does not challenge Judge Medley's ruling on whether 
proceedings before the Division are properly viewed as remedial, rather than quasi-
criminal. Rolfe's brief at 8 n.4. While Beller's brief initially assumes arguendo that 
Judge Medley's ruling that the hearings are properly viewed as civil is correct, Beller's 
opening brief at 11, pages 11 through 19 of the brief do take issue with Judge Medley's 
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review. See Pratt, supra. 
III. THE WAIVER DOCTRINE APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL 
PARTIES APPEARING IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARINGS. 
Rolfe claims that all cases applying the waiver doctrine in appeals from 
administrative hearings apply it only against the petitioners, and that the doctrine is not 
properly applied against respondents. Rolfe's brief at 17-18. The cases upon which the 
State relies are all appeals from petitioners aggrieved by agencies, and do not involve 
cross-appeals by the agencies, and thus, the cases have no occasion to address whether the 
waiver doctrine applies to a respondent who is before the court on appeal. E.g., Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co.. 922 P.2d 745 (Utah 1996); Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 
587 (Utah App. 1990); Barney v. Utah Department of Commerce. 885 P.2d 809 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
The general rule requiring a "party" to raise their claims before the agencies is not 
intended to "hobble" only those petitioners who seek judicial review of an agency action, 
as Rolfe claims on page 17 of her brief. Rather, the rule applies to respondents, as well as 
petitioners. See Yeargin Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 2001 UT App 146,2001 WL 
463191 (unpublished opinion) (holding that the respondent tax commission waived its 
conclusion that the state constitutional exclusionary rule does not apply, and specifically 
argues that the division proceedings meet the criteria set forth in Sims to be viewed and 
treated as quasi-criminal proceedings. 
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argument it attempted to raise on appeal by failing to raise the argument in the 
administrative hearing). 
IV. THE STATUTES GOVERNING DRIVER LICENSE 
HEARINGS PERMIT INQUIRY INTO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRAFFIC STOPS. 
Rolph contends that this Court should apply the plain language of the statutes 
governing driver license hearings. Rolfe's brief at 22-23. Beller agrees that it is the 
function of the legislature to draft and enact specific and understandable, not the function 
of the courts. See Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1 and Article V § 1. The 
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers logically requires the Court's fealty to the 
plain language enacted by the legislature. 
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a statute is 
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The courts 
owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says in the text 
of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will-
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the 
legislature. 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 46.03. 
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 mandates that hearing officers 
consider whether a police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the driver was 
violating the DUI statute or related laws and whether the driver refused a chemical test, 
and does not limit the inquiry to those two factors. Subsection (3) provides: 
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6a-502, 41-
6a-517. 41-6a-530, 53-3-23L or 53-3-232; and 
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under 
Section 4 l-6a-520. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 likewise requires a hearing officer to consider whether a 
police officer had reasonable grounds to believe the driver was violating the DUI statute 
or related laws whether the driver refused a chemical test, and any results of the test, and 
does not limit the inquiry to these three factors. Subsection 6(c) of the statute provides: 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was 
driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 4 l-6a-502 or 41-6a-517; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
Had the legislature intended to exclude issues from the purview of the driver 
license hearings, it could easily have said so, by indicating that the hearings should cover 
only the issues specified in the statutes, or by specifying that constitutional issues shall 
not be addressed. 
Rolfe argues that the legislature's use of the phrase "reasonable grounds" is not 
properly read as encompassing inquiry into probable cause or related constitutional issues. 
Rolfe's brief at 24. The phrase "reasonable grounds" is actually a phrase used by the 
courts in assessing the constitutionality of traffic stops. For instance, in State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994), in rejecting pretext doctrine in traffic stops, the court 
cited with approval United States v. Maeiia. 928 F.2d 810, 814-15 (8th Cir. 1991) for this 
10 
parenthetical proposition: "otherwise valid traffic stop based on 'discrete and objectively 
reasonable grounds' does not 'become unreasonable merely because the officer knows 
that the car is allegedly involved in the transportation of drugs.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1137. 
Rolfe argues that the Utah Supreme Court defined the "reasonable grounds" phrase 
used in the driver's license statutes in Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979), 
without relying on "the Fourth Amendment or federal case law interpreting it." Rolfe's 
brief at 25. Ballard was interpreting a precursor statute to those at issue here, which at 
that time did not include the word reasonable. See Ballard, 505 P.2d at 1306. After 
reading the reasonableness requirement into the statute, the court defined reasonable 
grounds as follows: 
"Reasonable grounds" exist where the facts and circumstances within the 
officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy 
information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the situation exists. 
Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1306 and n. 10, citing Glass v. People, Colo., 493 P.2d 1347 (Colo 
1972), and Saunders v. Commissioner of Public Safety, Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 19 (1975). 
The definition of reasonable cause adopted by the Ballard court is substantially the same 
as standard definitions for probable cause for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g.. 
State v.Trane, 2002 UT 97, ^ 27, 57 P.3d 1052.4 
4
 Trane quotes numerous state and federal authorities defining probable cause for 
Fourth Amendment purposes with words nearly identical to the reasonable cause 
11 
The cases cited by Ballard in support of this definition actually do apply standard 
Fourth Amendment definitions of probable cause. Glass addresses warrantless arrests, 
stating: 
C.R.S.1963, 39-2-20 provides in part that an officer may make an arrest 
without a warrant 'when a criminal offense has in fact been committed, and 
he has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has 
committed it.' This court has held that 'probable cause' and 'reasonable 
grounds1 are substantially equivalent in meaning. 
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the 
officers1 knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy 
information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. Ker v. 
California. 374 U.S. 23; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160; Gonzales 
v. People. 398 P.2d 236; Lavato v. People. 411 P.2d 328. 
definition adopted in Ballard. It provides: 
The United States Supreme Court defined probable cause justifying 
an arrest as "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in 
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is 
committing, or is about to commit an offense." DeFillippo. 443 U.S. at 37, 
99 S.Ct. 2627; see also Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct 854, 
43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Beck v. Ohio. 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 
L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar. 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302. Similarly, 
this court explained that in Utah the determination of whether the police had 
probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant" 'should be made on 
an objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences [that can] fairly... be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing that the 
suspect had committed the offense.' " State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 
(Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher. 27 Utah 2d 318, 320,495 P.2d 1259, 
1260 (1972)); see also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232-33 (Utah 
1996). 
Trane at f 27. 
12 
Glass 493 P.2d at 1348-49 (string citations omitted). 
Similarly, Saunders defines reasonable cause to believe a driver is under the 
influence for driver's license hearings as follows: 
The 'reasonable grounds1 test is met where the facts and circumstances 
known to the officer at the time he was required to act warrant a prudent 
man in believing the offense has been or is being committed. 
Saunders, 226 N.W.2d at 22, citing Shelladv v. Sellers, 208 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa 1973). 
Shelladv expressly recognizes that reasonable grounds means probable cause. Id. at 214. 
Ballard, Glass, Saunders and Shelledv stand as examples which disprove Rolfe's 
assertion that "No case law ... adopts the radical statutory construction proffered by 
Beller,... which would equate 'reasonable grounds' in sections 41-a-521 and 53-3-223(6) 
with Fourth Amendment probable cause before an officer could carry out a traffic stop or 
administer sobriety tests." Rolfe's brief at 26. 
Rolfe is in error in asserting that the lower court correctly declined to read the 
phrase "reasonable grounds" in the driver license statutes as if it incorporated Fourth 
Amendment standards. See Rolfe's brief at 26. As was appropriate, particularly given 
the issue framed by Rolfe before the trial de novo, see R. 79: 3 (Ms. Waldron informed 
him that the only issue for trial was the reason for the stop), and given the evidence and 
argument presented to him which bore directly on that point (R. 79: 3-14, R. 32-40, 46-
48), Judge Medley actually did address the lawfulness of the traffic stop under the Fourth 
Amendment in the de novo review of the application of the driver license statute (R. 62-
13 
69). 
V. JUDGE MEDLEY ACTED WITHIN HIS DISCRETION IN RULING 
THAT THE STOP WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, PARTICULARLY 
GIVEN THE ERRONEOUS NATURE OF HIS CONCLUSION THAT 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DOES NOT APPLY. 
In challenging Judge Medley's ruling that Beller's traffic stop was 
unconstitutional, Rolfe asserts that Medley should not have addressed that issue, but 
instead should have ruled first and without further analysis that the exclusionary rule does 
not apply. Rolfe's brief at 26-29. It is true that courts often seek to avoid constitutional 
issues, e ^ State ex rel A.R.. 1999 UT 43, f 13, 78 P.2d 73 (indicating that it was not 
necessary to reach issue of constitutionality of warrantless searches if the exclusionary 
rule did not apply). However, courts do have the discretion to reach constitutional issues 
before considering whether the exclusionary rule applies. See, e.g.. State ex rel A.C.C., 
2002 UT 22, 44 P.3d 708 (court did not reach the issue of whether exclusionary rule 
applies in juvenile proceedings, but instead decided the case on the basis of lengthy 
Fourth Amendment analysis concluding that there was no privacy interest). See also Sims 
v. Collection Div. of Utah State Tax Div.. 841 P.2d 6 (Utah I992)(plurality) (fully 
analyzing why roadblock stop was unconstitutional before finding that exclusionary rule 
applied); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, passim and n.8 (Utah App. 1993) (the Court did not 
reach the issue of whether the exclusionary rule applied, but did find that the warrant 
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complied with the no-knock statute and the federal and state constitutions); State v. 
Kpury, 824 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991) (noting that exclusionary rule would not apply to 
private search, but rather than deciding whether search was private and exclusionary rule 
did not apply, Court found that search was consensual by applying Fourth Amendment 
law). 
Rolfe contends that because the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, 
Judge Medley should have addressed the non-constitutional issue prior to reaching the 
constitutionality of the traffic stop. Rolfe's brief at 28. 
Judge Medley's ruling regarding the exclusionary rule was primarily focused on 
the application of the Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule. This rule is constitutionally 
mandated. See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460,471-73 (Utah 1990) {plurality) 
(recognizing privacy interest in interior of car and adopting exclusionary rule as a 
necessary consequence of Article I § 14 and noting that there are no recognized 
exceptions to this exclusionary rule); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415,416-20 (Utah 
1991) (majority of the Court recognized privacy interest in bank records under Article I § 
14, held in accordance with Larocco that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a 
violation of Article I § 14, and that no exceptions had been recognized to the Utah 
exclusionary rule); State v. DeBoov. 996 P.2d 546, 554 (Utah 2000) (finding exclusion of 
illegal checkpoint stop to be a necessary consequence of Article I § 14); State v. 
Ziegelman. 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) (finding that violation of Fourth 
15 
Amendment during traffic stop required suppression under Larocco). 
VI. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT ROLFE'S CHALLENGE 
TO JUDGE MEDLEY'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
THAT THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS ILLEGAL FROM ITS 
INCEPTION. 
It is axiomatic that a party challenging a trial court's findings of fact is obligated to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings. E.g., In re Estate of Bees lev, 
883 P.2d 1343, 1347, 1349 (Utah 1994). 
Rolfe directly challenges a factual finding of Judge Medley, without marshaling 
the evidence in footnote 11 on page 31 of her brief, where she argues, "Contrary to 
Beller's representation, R. 35, 38, accepted by Judge Medley, R. 65, the transcript shows 
Officer Kendrick did not testify that he believed Beller's bike was custom made." 
Because Rolfe did not marshal the evidence, the Court should disregard the argument. 
Beeslev, supra.5 
Rather than directly challenging the remainder of Judge Medley's factual analysis, 
Rolfe simply argues facts in a manner inconsistent with Judge Medley's ruling. Rolfe's 
brief at 29-31. This portion of her brief is independently subject to being disregarded or 
5The evidence which supports the finding is Kendrick's testimony that he could not 
tell what kind of bike Beller was driving (R. 79: 7, 9,12,13), and that he was not aware 
of any manufacturer of street motorcycles who made mufflers such as he apparently 
observed on Beller's motorcycle (R. 79: 12). 
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stricken because it fails to cite to the record. See Ut. R. App. P. 24(a)(9), Beehive Tel. 
Co, supra. 
The failure to cite to the record is perhaps explained by the inaccuracies in Rolfe's 
brief, which are an independent basis for striking or disregarding Rolfe's brief under the 
plain language of Rule 24(k), supra. See id. 
In what appears to be an indirect challenge to Judge Medley's finding that there 
was insufficient proof that Kendrick had adequate experience to detect the sound of a 
modified muffler,6 Rolfe asserts that the officer who made the stop was "a veteran 
motorcycle cop on traffic control, with ten years of experience." Rolfe's brief at 29. See 
also Rolfe's brief at 2 (making the same essential assertion). The record reflects that 
Kendrick had been a police officer for ten and a half years, who was assigned to the 
motorcycle squad, and who rode a motorcycle at the time of the stop and hearing (R. 79: 
3), but does not indicate that he had served ten years as a "motorcycle cop" or that he had 
ten years of that experience or of experience on traffic control. Rolfe's failure to 
accurately argue and cite to the record in marshaling the evidence in support of the 
6His memorandum decision provides, 
Officer Kendrick further testified that petitioner's motorcycle 
muffler was extremely loud and was suspected to be modified. Officer 
Kendrick based his suspicion upon his experience with motorcycles, yet 
other than riding a Harley Davidson Road King, the record is noticeably 
lacking any specificity describing Officer Kendrick's experience, such as 
how many years he owned and operated motorcycles? How is Officer 
Kendrick familiar with the sound of original and modified motorcycles? 
(R. 65). 
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findings she challenges absolves this Court of the need to address her arguments. See, 
e.g., Beeslev, Rule 24, supra. 
In what appears to be another indirect challenge to Judge Medley's factual 
analysis, Rolfe relies on Kendrick's testimony that Beller's motorcycle looked similar to 
his (R. 79: 13). See Rolfe's brief at 29. However, Rolfe fails to acknowledge his 
testimony that he did not know what make, model or type of motorcycle Beller was 
driving (R. 79: 7, 9, 12, 13), testimony which was key to Judge Medley's factual 
analysis.7 
For the first time on appeal, Rolfe posits that Kendrick's stop of Beller was 
justified to investigate an equipment violation or noise violation. Rolfe's brief at 30. 
Because Rolfe has failed to provide a justification for this Court to address this claim 
raised for the first time on appeal, the Court should disregard it. See, e.g., Timmv. 
Dewsnup, supra. In support of this argument, Rolfe never identifies any noise ordinance 
which applied to Beller's motorcycle, and thus the issue is not adequately briefed to 
justify this Court's consideration. See, e.g.. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
7In the course of rejecting the argument that the stop was based on a reasonable 
suspicion of a muffler modification violation, Judge Medley's ruling stated: 
Officer Kendrick testified that at the inception of the stop, he could not 
identify the make or model of petitioner's motorcycle, nor its factory 
specifications. Other than Officer Kendrick's experience, which was not 




1998) (parties are not to dump the burdens of research and argument on appellate courts). 
Rolfe's reliance on State v. Mitchell 2002 UT App 163, 2002 LW 1000298 
(unpublished), in support of its equipment violation theory, is misplaced, because 
Mitchell involved a clicking noise which made the trooper believe that perhaps the wheel 
of a car was about to fall off, and thus the car was in violation of the statute generally 
requiring cars to be in safe working order, currently found at Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
1601. See Mitchell. In contrast here, there was never any testimony that Kendrick 
believed that Beller's motorcycle was in dangerous working order. Rather, the record 
shows that Kendrick saw and heard Beller's motorcycle pass once without taking any 
action, and that the main reason he decided to stop it was because the motorcycle driven 
by Beller's companion came too close to a police motorcycle parked by the side of the 
road and posed a danger to the officer (R. 79:4, 5, 7, 8, 9). While the officer did discuss 
the muffler modification ordinance when the prosecutor asked him about it (R. 79: 5), he 
never testified that he thought that Beller's muffler had been modified or that it seemed to 
be in unsafe working condition. Rather, he testified that he thought it was "excessively 
loud and against the law." (R. 79: 5). 
Rolfe argues that Kendrick's suspicion that Beller's muffler had been modified on 
the basis of Kendrick's purported testimony that 
He saw an aftermarket modification, a "supertrap style" muffler on Beller's 
bike, and he knew of no motorcycle manufactured with such a device, 
which has adjustable discs that allow the volume of the exhaust to be 
modified. And he saw spark plugs mounted in the muffler itself, with wires 
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going to the undercarriage, an unusual configuration also suggesting that 
the muffler system had been modified after manufacture. 
Rolfe'sbriefat30. 
Kendrick never testified that he believed that Better's muffler had been modified, 
but only described the muffler modification ordinance and then asserted that he thought 
Beller's bike was "excessively loud and against the law." (R. 79: 5). Assuming that this 
testimony is properly read as a claim that he suspected that Beller's muffler had been 
modified, Kendrick did not testify that the "supertrap" muffler, or the spark plug 
configuration were an "aftermarket modification," as Rolfe claims. Rather, after 
describing the muffler and spark plugs, and counsel for Beller continued to press him, 
Kendrick conceded that he did not know if the manufacturer of Beller's motorcycle made 
it that way (R. 79: 12-13). 
Rolfe argues as if Judge Medley imposed an impossible burden on the police under 
the muffler modification ordinance, to either show that the officer assessed the noise 
emitted with some decibel measuring device, or to show that the officer knew the make or 
model and factory specifications and the kind of muffler installed. Rolfe's brief at 3 L 
This argument misstates Judge Medley's actual ruling, which actually turned on the 
failure of Rolfe to detail the officer's experience which was the sole basis for his 
supposed suspicion of a muffler modification violation. Judge Medley found: 
Officer Kendrick further testified that petitioner's motorcycle 
muffler was extremely loud and was suspected to be modified. Officer 
Kendrick based his suspicion upon his experience with motorcycles, yet 
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other than riding a Harley Davidson Road King, the record is noticeably 
lacking any specificity describing Officer Kendrick's experience, such as 
how many years he owned and operated motorcycles? How is Officer 
Kendrick familiar with the sound of original and modified motorcycles? 
Officer Kendrick testified that at the inception of the stop, he could not 
identify the make or model of petitioner's motorcycle, nor its factory 
specifications. Other than Officer Kendrick's experience, which was not 
detailed, he had no other objective means of determining the decibles of 
petitioner's motorcycle. Officer Kendrick could not with any degree of 
reliability form a reasonable suspicion that petitioners's muffler had been 
unlawfully modified. Finally, Officer Kendrick testified he believed 
petitioner's motorcycle was custom made, that he did not know the bike's 
specifications, nor what kind of muffler was originally installed, therefore, 
Officer Kendrick could not form a reasonable suspicion the petitioner 
violated Salt Lake City Code § 12.28.100. 
(R. 65). 
After reading Judge Medley's analysis in a full and fair manner, this Court should 
find that its factual underpinnings were not clearly erroneous, and that his legal 
conclusion regarding the absence of a reasonable suspicion to stop were correct. 
CONCLUSION 
Beller stands by all positions asserted in his original brief. 
This Court should affirm Judge Medley's ruling that the traffic stop was 
unsupported by a reasonable suspicion. The Court should reverse Judge Medley's ruling 
that the state constitutional exclusionary rule has no application in this context, and order 
that Rolfe may not rely on evidence gained by the unlawful stop in revoking or 
suspending Beller's driver license. 
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ADDENDUM 
STATUTES AND COURT RULE 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-521 
(l)(a) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's intention to revoke 
the person's license under Section 4l-6a-520 is entitled to a hearing. 
(b) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten calendar days after the 
day on which notice is provided. 
(c) Upon request in a manner specified by the Driver License Division, the Driver License 
Division shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date 
of arrest. 
(d) If the person does not make a request for a hearing before the Driver License Division 
under this Subsection (1), the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in the state is 
revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (l)(d)(ii) applies; or 
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the 
date of arrest under Section 4 l-6a-517, 41-6a-520, 41-6a-530. 53-3-223. 53-3-23 L or 53-
3-232: or 
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of 
arrest under Section 4 l-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that would 
constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502. 
(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), if a hearing is requested by the person, the 
hearing shall be conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the 
offense occurred. 
(b) The Driver License Division may hold a hearing in some other county if the Driver 
License Division and the person both agree. 
(3) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(a) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating 
a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41 -6a-502,41-6a-517,41-6a-530, 53-3-23 L or 53-
3-232: and 
(b) whether the person refused to submit to the test or tests under Section 4 l-6a-520. 
(4)(a) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized agent: 
(i) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers; and 
(ii) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers. 
(b) The Driver License Division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Section 78- 46-28. 
(5)(a) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the person was 
requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or 
if the person fails to appear before the Driver License Division as required in the notice, 
the Driver License Division shall revoke the person's license or permit to operate a motor 
vehicle in Utah beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) 18 months unless Subsection (5)(a)(ii) applies; or 
(ii) 24 months if the person has had a previous: 
(A) license sanction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the 
date of arrest under Section 4 l-6a-517, 41-6a-520,41-6a-530, 53-3-223. 53-3-23 L or 53-
3-232; or 
(B) conviction for an offense that occurred within the previous ten years from the date of 
arrest under Section 4 l-6a-502 or a statute previously in effect in this state that would 
constitute a violation of Section 41-6a-502. 
(b) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee 
imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be 
paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(c) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court decision 
following a proceeding allowed under Subsection (2) that the revocation was improper. 
(6)(a) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License Division under 
this section may seek judicial review. 
(b) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
(c) Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601 
(l)(a) A person may not operate or move and an owner may not cause or knowingly 
permit to be operated or moved on a highway a vehicle or combination of vehicles which: 
(i) is in an unsafe condition that may endanger any person; 
(ii) does not contain those parts or is not at all times equipped with lamps and other 
equipment in proper condition and adjustment as required in this chapter; 
(iii) is equipped in any manner in violation of this chapter; or 
(iv) emits pollutants in excess of the limits allowed under the rules of the Air Quality 
Board created under Title 19, Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act, or under rules made by 
local health departments. 
(b) A person may not do any act forbidden or fail to perform any act required under this chapter 
(2)(a) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, 
and in coordination with the rules made under Section 53-8-204, the department shall 
make rules setting minimum standards covering the design, construction, condition, and 
operation of vehicle equipment for safely operating a motor vehicle on the highway as 
required under this part. 
(b) The rules under Subsection (2)(a): 
(i) shall conform as nearly as practical to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards and 
Regulations; 
(ii) may incorporate by reference, in whole or in part, the federal standards under 
Subsection (2)(b)(i) and nationally recognized and readily available standards and codes 
on motor vehicle safety; 
(iii) shall include provisions for the issuance of a permit under Section 41 -6a-1602; 
(iv) shall include standards for the emergency lights of authorized emergency vehicles; 
(v) may provide standards and specifications applicable to lighting equipment on school 
buses consistent with: 
(A) this part; 
(B) federal motor vehicle safety standards; and 
(C) current specifications of the Society of Automotive Engineers; 
(vi) shall provide procedures for the submission, review, approval, disapproval, issuance 
of an approval certificate, and expiration or renewal of approval of any part as required 
under Section 41-6a-1620; 
(vii) shall establish specifications for the display or etching of a vehicle identification 
number on a vehicle; 
(viii) shall establish specifications in compliance with this part for a flare, fusee, electric 
lantern, warning flag, or portable reflector used in compliance with this part; 
(ix) shall establish approved safety and law enforcement purposes when video display is 
visible to the motor vehicle operator; and 
(x) shall include standards and specifications for both original equipment and parts 
included when a vehicle is manufactured and aftermarket equipment and parts included 
after the original manufacture of a vehicle. 
(c) The following standards and specifications for vehicle equipment are adopted: 
(i) 49 C.F.R. 571.209 related to safety belts; 
(ii) 49 C.F.R. 571.213 related to child restraint devices; 
(iii) 49 C.F.R. 393, 396, and 396 Appendix G related to commercial motor vehicles and 
trailers operated in interstate commerce; 
(iv) 49 C.F.R. 571 Standard 108 related to lights and illuminating devices; and 
(v) 40 C.F.R. 82.30 through 82.42 and Part 82, Subpart B, Appendix A and B related to 
air conditioning equipment. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter or the rules made by the department prohibit: 
(a) equipment required by the United States Department of Transportation; or 
(b) the use of additional parts and accessories on a vehicle not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter or the rules made by the department. 
(4) Except as specifically made applicable, the provisions of this chapter and rules of the 
department with respect to equipment required on vehicles do not apply to: 
(a) implements of husbandry; 
(b) road machinery; 
(c) road rollers; 
(d) farm tractors; 
(e) motorcycles; 
(f) motor-driven cycles; 
(g) vehicles moved solely by human power; 
(h) off-highway vehicles registered under Section 41-22-3 either: 
(i) on a highway designated as open for off-highway vehicle use; or 
(ii) in the manner prescribed by Section 41-22-10.3; or 
(i) off-highway implements of husbandry when operated in the manner prescribed by 
Subsections 41-22-5.5 (3) through (5). 
(5) The vehicles referred to in Subsections (4)(h) and (i) are subject to the equipment 
requirements of Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-highway Vehicles, and the rules made under 
that chapter. 
(6)(a) A federal motor vehicle safety standard supersedes any conflicting provision of this 
chapter. 
(b) The department: 
(i) shall report any conflict found under Subsection (6)(a) to the appropriate committees 
or officials of the Legislature; and 
(ii) may adopt a rule to replace the superseded provision. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-223 
(l)(a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person may be violating 
or has violated Section 4 l-6a-502, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle with a certain 
blood or breath alcohol concentration and driving under the influence of any drug, 
alcohol, or combination of a drug and alcohol or while having any measurable controlled 
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in violation of 
Section 4 l-6a-517, the peace officer may, in connection with arresting the person, request 
that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to be administered in compliance with 
the standards under Section 4 l-6a-520. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 4 l-6a-502 includes any similar local ordinance 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41 -6a-510(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to a chemical 
test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41-6a-517 shall, and 
the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the person incapable of safely 
driving a motor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of the person's license to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a blood or breath 
alcohol content in violation of Section 41-6a-502 or 41- 6a-517, or if a peace officer 
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise in 
violation of Section 41-6a-502. a peace officer shall, on behalf of the division and within 
24 hours of arrest, give notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's license to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
(4)(a) When a peace officer gives notice on behalf of the division, the peace officer shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the driver; 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days from the date of arrest; 
and 
(iii) supply to the driver, in a manner specified by the division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division. 
(b) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if provided in a manner specified by the 
division, also serve as the temporary license certificate. 
(5) As a matter of procedure, a peace officer shall send to the division within ten calendar 
days after the day on which notice is provided: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 
(c) a signed report in a manner specified by the division indicating the chemical test 
results, if any; and 
(d) any other basis for the peace officer's determination that the person has violated 
Section 4l-6a-502 or 41-6a-517. 
(6)(a) Upon request in a manner specified by the division, the division shall grant to the 
person an opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. The request to be 
heard shall be made within ten calendar days of the day on which notice is provided under 
Subsection (5). 
(b)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b)(ii), a hearing, if held, shall be before the 
division in the county in which the arrest occurred. 
(ii) The division may hold a hearing in some other county if the division and the person 
both agree. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was driving a 
motor vehicle in violation of Section 41 -6a-502 or 41-6a-517: 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d)(i) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and 
the production of relevant books and papers; or 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace officers, 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Section 78-46-28. 
(e) The division may designate one or more employees to conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before any designated employee is as valid as if 
made by the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a motor 
vehicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held fails to appear before the division as 
required in the notice, the division shall order whether the person's license to drive a 
motor vehicle is suspended or not. 
(7)(a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this Subsection (7), is 
for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension for an offense that occurred within the previous 
ten years under this Subsection (7) is for a period of one year, beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest. 
(8)(a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 53-3-205(13) for driving under the influence, a fee under Section 53-3-105 to 
cover administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is 
reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division 
hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under this section may file 
a petition within 30 days after the suspension for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is 
governed by Section 53-3-224. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 
(a) Brief of the appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose 
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on 
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page 
which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, 
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where 
they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the 
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be 
set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is 
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the 
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and 
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in 
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be 
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall 
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such 
an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this 
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the 
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall 
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance 
cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; 
in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the 
court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or 
the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of 
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include: 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the 
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if 
the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of 
the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to 
answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief 
shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No 
further briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral 
arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" 
and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the 
agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential 
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right 
comer and each separately numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or 
transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit 
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, 
offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 
50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the 
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, 
regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing 
a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall 
exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages. 
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in 
the appeal. 
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present 
the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief 
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of 
Cross-Appellant. 
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to 
the Brief of Cross-Appellee. 
(h) Permission for over length brief- While such motions are disfavored, the court for 
good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the 
limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the 
number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A 
motion filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer 
additional pages need not be accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than 
seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall 
be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is 
granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without 
further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be 
destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more 
than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, 
any number of either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt 
by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities 
come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral 
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed 
in the Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of 
Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued 
orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons 
for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented 
with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
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FN1. We cite to the current version of the 
statute for ease of reference, as the current 
version does not differ in any relevant way 
from the version in effect at the time of 
Gonzales's arrest. 
Gonzales v. Biackstock 
Utah App.,2005. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
John GONZALES, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
G. Barton BLACKSTOCK, Bureau Chief, Driver 
Control Bureau; and Department of Public Safety, 
DriverXicense Division, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20040274-CA. 
June 3, 2005. 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 030925487; The 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki. 
Jason Schatz, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. ShurtlefFand Rebecca D. Waldron, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellees. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and JACKSON. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge: 
*1 John Gonzales appeals the district court's order 
upholding the suspension of his driving privileges due 
to his refusal to submit to chemical testing after being 
arrested for driving under the influence. Gonzales 
argues that the arresting officer failed to properly advise 
Gonzales of his rights under Utah's Implied Consent 
Law. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp.2004).^ 
We review for correctness the district court's legal 
determination that, under the facts of this case, the 
officer complied with the requirements of Utah Code 
section 41-6-44.10. See Miller v. Biackstock 2001 UT 
App 352,16, 36 P.3d 525. 
Gonzales contends that he thought the breath tesf 
administered by the officer produced a valid result. 
According to Gonzales, Utah law required the officer to 
recognize and clarify Gonzales's confusion. In addition, 
Gonzales argues that the officer was required to recite 
the standard admonitions a second time before 
requesting that Gonzales submit to a blood test. 
Under Utah law, we must determine whether the officer 
provided warnings " 'that a person of reasonable 
intelligence, who is in command of his senses, would 
understand.'" Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766, 767 
(Utah 1986) (quoting Muir v Cox, 611 P.2d 384, 386 
(Utah 1980) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Thus, Gonzales's 
subjective state of mind is not relevant to our inquiry. 
The record demonstrates that the officer informed 
Gonzales of his rights and obligations under Utah Code 
section 41-6-44.10 prior to administering the breath 
test. Gonzales agreed to take the test. The officer 
explained the test procedure to Gonzales. However, 
Gonzales did not follow the procedure, despite repeated 
requests to do so. The officer showed Gonzales the 
breath test report that indicated that the breath sample 
provided by Gonzales was insufficient to produce a 
valid result. The officer then requested Gonzales to 
submit to a blood test, explaining to Gonzales that a 
refusal to submit to the test would result in an 18-month 
suspension of his driving privileges. Gonzales indicated 
that he had already taken the breath test, and would not 
submit to the blood draw. The officer told Gonzales that 
the breath test did not yield a valid result due to his 
refusal to follow instructions, which is regarded as a 
refusal. Yet, given multiple opportunities to comply 
with the officer's requests, Gonzales refused to submit 
to the required tests. We conclude that the officer 
provided Gonzales warnings that were sufficient to 
apprise a person of reasonable intelligence of his rights 
under Utah Code section 41-6-44.10. 
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order 
upholding the suspension of Gonzales's driving 
privileges. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS and NORMAN H. 
JACKSON. Judges. 
Utah App.,2005. 
Gonzales v. Blackstock 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 1317061 (Utah App.), 
2005 UT App 256 
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Nolen v. Hamaker-Mann 
Utah App.,2006. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Arlene NOLEN, Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Judy HAMAKER-MANN, Director, Utah Driver's 
License Division, Respondent and Appellee. 
No. 20050877-CA. 
March 9, 2006. 
Second District, Layton Department, 040604864; The 
Honorable Thomas L. Kay. 
Glen W. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleif, Brent A. Burnett, and Rebecca D. 
Waldron, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS. DAVIS, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Arlene Nolen appeals the suspension of her driver 
license based on the trial court's determination that she 
refused to take a breath test as required under Utah 
Code section 41-6-44.10. See Utah Code Ann. § 
41.6-44.10 (SUPD.2004) j ^ We affirm. 
FN I. This section has since been amended and 
renumbered but was the controlling law at the 
time of Nolen's arrest and refusal 
Nolen argues that the trial court erred in finding that she 
refused to take the test. "The determination that [a 
driver's] failure to respond to the officer or to take the 
test amounts to a refusal is a factual finding which we 
will not disturb when supported by substantial 
evidence." Lee v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766. 767 
(Utah 1986). "A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). To 
properly challenge a fact finding, an appellant must 
marshal the evidence and "then demonstrate that even 
viewing [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." Tannery Carter. 2001 UT 18, <[ 17.20P.3d 
332. If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, this 
court need not consider the challenge to the finding. See 
id, 
Nolen fails to marshal the evidence supporting the 
determination of refusal. Instead, she presents only facts 
favorable to her, ignoring the substantial evidence 
supporting the fact that she refused the test. As a result, 
this court need not reach her challenge to the trial 
court's finding. See id. 
Affirmed. 
Utah App.,2006. 
Nolen v. Hamaker-Mann 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 563296 (Utah App.), 
2006 UT App 97 
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State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct 1870, 1877 (1980)). 
Nothing in the record suggests that any of these or 
similar indicators were present to show that Defendant 
was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. To the 
contrary, the totality of the circumstances indicate that 
Trooper Eldredge's " ' conduct would [not] have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person 
was not free to decline the officer's requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or 
her business.'" Hansen, 2000 UT App at ^  12 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, the questions Defendant 
complains of were not asked during the course of a 
"seizure," as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment, 
and Defendant's " 'consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of [a] prior illegality.' "Id. at^ f 18 (citation 
omitted). 
In summary, Defendant's consent was valid because it 
" *was given voluntarily, and ... was not obtained by 
police exploitation of [a] prior illegality.' "Id. (citation 
omitted). 
*3 Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge and 
PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2002. 
State v. Mitchell 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2002 WL 1000298 (Utah App.), 
2002 UT App 163 
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Yeargin, Inc. v. State Tax Coirin 
UtahApp.,2001, 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
YEARGIN, INC., Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, Auditing Division, 
Respondent. 
No. 981342-CA. 
May 3, 2001. 
Robert A. Peterson, Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Mark L. ShurtlefF and Gale K. Francis, Salt Lake City, 
for respondent. 




*1 The present case, between Yeargin, Inc. (Yeargin) 
and the Auditing Division of the State Tax Commission 
(the Division), is before this court on remand from the 
supreme court. Two years ago, we affirmed the Tax 
Commission's ruling that Yeargin was liable for the 
sales tax assessment as a real property contractor who 
purchased tangible personal property and affixed it to 
real property. See Yeargin, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 1999 
UT APP 94,1f 25,~977 P.2d 527 {Yeargin I). In our 
prior opinion, we did not reach the alternate theories for 
imposing taxes on Yeargin that were argued in the 
Division's briefing. On certiorari, the supreme court 
reversed our "real property contractor" ruling. It 
concluded that a stipulation between the parties stood 
"for the fact that Yeargin did not own or purchase any 
materials for the facility." Yeargin. Inc. v. Auditing Div. 
of the State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, <[ 47, 414 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27 (Yeargin II). Thus, "Yeargin cannot be 
Pagel 
UT App 146 
considered a real property contractor for the purposes 
of sales tax liability." Id The supreme court then 
remanded for us to consider the two other theories 
under which Yeargin might be liable for taxes: first, "as 
a vendor [and, second,] as a retail consumer." Id at ^ 
48. We reject both arguments. 
The Division did not preserve its argument that Yeargin 
is liable for taxes as a "vendor" before the Tax 
Commission, thus it is waived. See U.S. Xpress, Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n. 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) ( "[IJssues cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal."). Further, the supreme court's ruling in 
Yeargin //forecloses the argument. The supreme court 
concluded that "Yeargin did not own or purchase any 
materials for the facility, [thus,] evidence cannot be 
admitted to contradict that fact." — Yeargin II, 2001 
UT 11 atf 47. Moreover, the Tax Commission did not 
make any finding that Yeargin was involved in the sale 
of materials to the building owner. Since Yeargin was 
not involved in the purchase, ownership, or sale of any 
of the materials under the Division's scrutiny, Yeargin 
cannot be liable as a vendor. See Utah Code Ann. § 
59-12-102(27)fa)(i) (1996) (defining vendor as "any 
person receiving any payment or consideration upon a 
sale of tangible personal property or any other taxable 
item or service" (emphasis added)). 
FN1. "The express ruling by [the supreme 
court] on all issues raised by prior appeal 
becomes the law of the case and is binding 
upon the parties, the trial court[, the court of 
appeals,] and [the supreme court]." C & J 
Indus, v. Bailev, 669 P.2d 855, 856 (Utah 
1983). 
Finally, the Division's argument that Yeargin is liable 
for taxes as a "retail consumer" under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-107 (1996) was not mentioned in any 
document submitted or argument presented to the tax 
commission. The Division asserted tax liability only 
under Utah Code Ann. § 51-12-103 (1996) before the 
Tax Commission. Thus, the Tax Commission did not 
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State v. Mitchell 
UtahApp.,2002. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Michael Eugene MITCHELL, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20010473-CA. 
May 16, 2002. 
Seventh District, Monticello Department; The 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. 
William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleffand Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before Judges JACKSON, DAVIS, and 
GREENWOOD. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress — evidence discovered by Trooper 
Eldredge following Defendant's consent to search his 
vehicle. 
FN1. We review findings of fact that underlie 
the trial court's suppression decision for clear 
error, and its legal conclusions based upon 
those findings for correctness. See State v. 
Kohl, 2000 UT 35,<f9, 999 P.2d 7. 
Warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment unless conducted pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement One 
such exception includes searches conducted pursuant to 
consent. However, for a consent search to be valid, 
consent must have been given voluntarily and not have 
been "obtained by police exploitation of ... prior 
illegality." 
State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, % 43, 37 P.3d 1073 
(citations omitted). Defendant challenges the trial 
court's rulings that his consent was voluntary and that it 
was not obtained through exploitation of a prior 
illegality. We affirm. 
We first address the voluntariness — of Defendant's 
consent. 
FN2. We review "the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion that consent was voluntary or 
involuntary ... for correctness." State v. 
Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, «l 7, 17 P.3d 
1135. 
Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product 
of duress or coercion, express or implied." Factors 
indicating a lack of duress or coercion, which should be 
assessed in the "totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances," include: "1) the absence of a claim of 
authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to 
search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the [property]; 
and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of 
the officer." 
Eisner, 2001 UT 99 at 11 47 (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). Nothing in the record indicates that 
Trooper Eldredge resorted to a claim of authority, an 
exhibition of force, or deception to obtain Defendant's 
consent. Moreover, Trooper Eldredge merely requested 
Defendant's consent, explaining several times that he 
was asking for a voluntary consent. Furthermore, 
Defendant signed a waiver, after Trooper Eldredge read 
the waiver to him, and he cooperated by opening the 
trunk of his vehicle for Trooper Eldredge. Thus, the 
trial court correctly concluded that Defendant's consent 
was voluntary. 
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Next, we consider whether Trooper Eldredge obtained 
Defendant's voluntary consent by exploiting a prior 
illegality. "In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, we 
consider two questions: [W]hether the officer's action 
was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place." State v. 
Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, «f 9, 17 P.3d 1135 
(alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). Defendant first argues that the stop was not 
justified. 
An officer is justified in stopping a vehicle "when the 
officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
driver is committing a traffic offense.... [A]s long as an 
officer suspects that the driver is violating any one of 
the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations, the police officer may legally stop the 
vehicle." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
1994) (alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling 
that the stop was justified at its inception, arguing that 
"no traffic violations, articulable or reasonable 
suspicion justifies the stop." However, Trooper 
Eldredge had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that 
Defendant was violating an equipment regulation, see 
Utah Code Ann. $g 41-6-117, -155 (1998), because he 
heard a "loud clicking noise" emanating from 
Defendant's vehicle as it passed. This caused Trooper 
Eldredge to believe that Defendant's vehicle was 
"obviously not in proper mechanical order," as if "a 
wheel [was] about to come off or something." Thus, the 
trial court correctly concluded that the stop was 
justified. 
*2 Next, Defendant asserts that Trooper Eldredge 
impermissibly expanded the scope of the stop by 
"asking [him] numerous unrelated questions he had no 
[ ] business asking1' after Trooper Eldredge "discovered 
there was no problem such that he would not let 
Defendant go with a warning." — Thus, he argues that 
although he "eventually consented to the search, he did 
so in the course of an illegal seizure." 
FN3. Defendant fails to specify of which 
questions he complains. However, the record 
reflects that the only questions Trooper 
Eldredge asked Defendant after he "let 
Defendant go with a warning," were to inquire 
about what items Defendant was responsible 
for in the vehicle. 
However, we conclude that Defendant was not seized 
for Fourth Amendment purposes after Trooper Eldredge 
told Defendant that he was "free to go." — Thus, there 
was no seizure when the questions Defendant complains 
of were asked and when Defendant consented to the 
search. 
FN4. The "determination of whether an 
encounter with law enforcement officers 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment ... is a legal conclusion that we 
review for correctness." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 
2000 UT App 55, <[ 8,998 P.2d 274. 
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a 
citizen is a seizure. A person is seized under the Fourth 
Amendment when, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that the person 
was not free to decline the officer's requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter and go about his or 
her business." 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at «f 12 (quoting State v. 
Hizzins. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994)). In the 
present case, Trooper Eldredge returned Defendant's 
license and other documents to him, "[hjanded him the 
written warning so that he would feel free and ... told 
him that he was free to go." Defendant testified that he 
then thanked Trooper Eldredge and asked him, "Is there 
some place down here I can get this checked?" Only 
after this point did Trooper Eldredge question 
Defendant about what he was responsible for in the 
vehicle and request consent to search it 
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate a 
seizure... would be the threatening presence of several 
officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some 
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use 
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer's request might be compelled." 
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hear or rule on section 59-12-107 as a basis for liability. 
Accordingly, the issue was not preserved for appeal. "It 
is well settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances 
or plain error, issues cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal." USXpress Inc.. 886 P.2d at 1119. "[T]he 
final settlement of controversies [ ] requires that a party 
must present [its] entire case and [its] ... theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done so, [it] 
cannot thereafter change to some different theory and 
thus attempt to keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation." Bundv v. Century Equip. Co , 692 P.2d 754, 
758 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). Further, the 
Division has not claimed, and we do not find, plain 
error or extraordinary circumstances. Thus, we cannot 
consider the Division's retail consumer theory. See id. 
*2 In Year gin II, the supreme court held that Yeargin 
was not liable for sales tax as a real property contractor. 
On remand, we hold that Yeargin is not liable for taxes 
as either a vendor or consumer. Accordingly, we 
reverse the Tax Commission's order ruling that Yeargin 
is liable for the taxes assessed. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge and BILLINGS, 
Judge, concur. 
UtahApp.,2001. 
Yeargin, Inc. v. State Tax Com'n 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 463191 (Utah App.), 
2001 UT App 146 
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